€200 million. One Union. Seven tranches.

August 2020 — €3.7 million. Emergency support after the 9 August elections: victims of repression, independent media. Announced by Ursula von der Leyen as part of a broader €53 million first-response package (including subsequent SME and media envelopes).

December 2020 — €24 million. Commission Decision C(2020)8954: «EU4Belarus: Solidarity with the People of Belarus». Four objectives: civil society and media (€8M), youth and scholarships (€8M), SMEs (€4M), health / COVID-19 (€4M). (decision annex, PDF)

December 2021 — €30 million. Decision C(2021)9448: «EU4Belarus: Reinforcing Resilience and Democratisation». Reinforced support for civil society, independent media, and education in exile.

December 2022 — €25 million. Decision C(2022)8721: «EU4Belarus: Supporting Societal Resilience and Human Capital». Civil society and human rights defenders — €10M; education and mobility — €15M. (decision annex, PDF)

December 2023 — €30 million. Programme «EU4People of Belarus: Human Rights and Education (2023)». Internal breakdowns of the 2023–2025 tranches are not publicly posted in annex form as of writing.

December 2024 — €30 million. Programme «EU4People of Belarus: Strengthen Human Rights and Education». Announced on 12 December 2024; at that point cumulative EU support since 2020 stood at €170 million. (EC press release, 12 December 2024)

December 2025 — €30 million. New «EU4People of Belarus» package announced on 9 December 2025 at a European Parliament conference with Kaja Kallas, Marta Kos and Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Five-year total: €200 million.

EU money does not flow directly to Belarusian NGOs. It flows through intermediaries — Member State agencies, intergovernmental foundations, cultural institutes, and framework partners — that then distribute sub-grants to end recipients. This is the standard NDICI architecture for countries without working government relations.

CPMA · Central Project Management Agency (Lithuania) — €27.4 million. Lead implementer for education programmes: SALT I (€4M), SALT II (€14M), SALT III (€9.4M), and the EHU Trust Fund (€4M) for the European Humanities University in Vilnius. End recipients are Belarusian students and researchers. (CPVA · SALT I · SALT III)

EBRD — €4 million. SME Abroad programme (ASB + Star Venture): advisory services for Belarusian SMEs in exile. 270+ enterprises reported as beneficiaries across Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, and Estonia. (EBRD)

Prague Civil Society Centre — €3 million. Free Media Hub EAST: re-grants to independent media in exile, with 15+ outlets named as recipients. (PCSC)

Goethe-Institut (Vilnius). MOST / MOST+ / MOST IV programme — mobility for professionals. The EU share is not publicly disaggregated; the programme itself reports 5,560+ participants since 2015.

Danish Cultural Institute — €2 million. ArtPower Belarus: 83 cultural projects, 231 direct participants. (Danish Cultural Institute)

EED · European Endowment for Democracy. Direct grants to NGOs and media; part of the 2020 €8M tranche was channelled through EED. EED does not publish its list of end recipients as a matter of principle — to protect staff and partners on the ground. This is a defensible policy under operational risk, but it produces a gap in public accountability.

DT Global Europe. EU4 Independent Media programme (EU4IM): grants up to €100k per journalism project. A full recipient breakdown is not posted in the Commission's public materials.

Framework Partnership Agreement (EuropeAid/164964/DH/FPA/Multi, 2019). The main channel for direct grants to large international NGOs. No consolidated list of partner organisations covering the Belarus track is publicly available.

Among end recipients named by donors or self-reported: Zerkalo.io (EED, «key institutional support»), Belsat TV (PLN 74 million in 2023, primary donor the Polish MFA), Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (€5.5M from the EU in 2025 after USAID was discontinued), IAPB (International Accountability Platform for Belarus, EU + 19 states basket fund), and 21 Belarusian outlets via JX Fund.

Part of the NDICI architecture is opaque by design — not from bad faith, but for security reasons. Publishing a list of end recipients inside Belarus can mean arrests. Donors and independent observers both accept this logic. But beyond that envelope there are zones where closure has no risk justification and makes public assessment harder.

Annexes to Commission decisions for 2023, 2024, and 2025. For the 2020 and 2022 tranches, the breakdown by objective and instrument is published as a PDF annex. For the 2023–2025 tranches, only press releases sit on DG NEAR's public site; the action document annexes with objective and instrument breakdowns are not posted.

The list of FPA partners. The Framework Partnership Agreement is the main «door» for large international NGOs to access direct EU grants. A consolidated list of organisations with FPAs on the Belarus track is not published.

EED's list of sub-grantees on Belarus. Not disclosed as a matter of policy. This is a donor decision, not a system gap; worth flagging separately.

MOST programme allocation from the EU envelope. The Goethe-Institut publishes overall programme statistics, but the EU share of the programme budget and its distribution across participant types is not publicly disaggregated.

In November 2025 the European Court of Auditors (ECA) published Special Report SR 11/2025, «Transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs». The report is not specifically about Belarus — it covers the entire system of EU budget funding to NGOs.

Key findings: EU funding to NGOs «remains opaque»; the Financial Transparency System (FTS) does not allow tracing end recipients of sub-grants; fund managers rely primarily on NGO self-declarations; no fraud was identified, but systemic traceability gaps were confirmed by the EU's own auditor.

This is an important anchor. When we describe the opacity of €200 million on the Belarus track, this is not a journalistic hypothesis — it is a statement by the EU's own auditor about the architecture through which Belarusian tranches also flow. (ECA · SR 11/2025)

We document what is known, flag what is closed, and use the right to access documents under Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. This is a legitimate mechanism available to any EU resident.

Three requests are in preparation: the breakdown of the 2023 and 2024 tranches (action documents), a consolidated list of FPA partners on the Belarus track, and aggregate SALT sub-grant statistics by recipient type and country.

The goal is not accusation but data integrity. So that anyone who wants to understand where €200 million goes can open a single page and see a complete, verifiable picture.

Godze does not draw conclusions about the integrity of any specific recipient. We record structure, amounts, and sources.